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THE SOCIAL TRANSMISSION OF RACISM 
Lisa C. Ikemoto 
OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF 
THE BLIND (STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014).  PP. 269. PAPERBACK $ 
24.95. 
 
ROBERT WALD SUSSMAN, THE MYTH OF RACE: THE TROUBLING PERSISTENCE 
OF AN UNSCIENTIFIC IDEA (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014).  PP. 374. 
PAPERBACK $ 19.95. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At first glance, the reason for pairing Robert Wald Sussman and Osagie K. Oba-
sogie’s recently published books seems perfectly obvious.1 Both books are not only about 
race and racism but also offer strong evidence of the social construction of race. That said 
the books differ significantly in approach and content. Sussman is an anthropologist. In 
The Myth of Race: The Troubling Persistence of an Unscientific Idea, he brings his an-
thropological expertise to bear upon tracing scientific racism through history. Obasogie is 
a legal scholar and sociologist. In Blinded by Sight: Seeing Race Through the Eyes of the 
Blind, he uses both qualitative data gathered through interviews with blind and sighted 
people and Critical Race Theory to explore racialization’s dependence on the idea that race 
is visually obvious and the implications for law of that obviousness. 
At their core, the projects are the same. Each book examines an idea that has sus-
tained racism despite social and political change. A recent study analyzing media con-
structions of athletics, biology, and race shows the relationship between the ideas that 
Sussman and Obasogie’s projects interrogate. In the study, Hughey and Goss examined 
English language sports stories in newspapers around the world.2 The stories were pub-
lished between 2003 and 2014. This period started shortly after science and world leaders 
                                                          
  Lisa C. Ikemoto, Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor, University of California-Davis School of Law. Thank you 
to Antonia Wong, King Hall class of 2016, for expert research assistance. All errors are my own. 
 1. ROBERT WALD SUSSMAN, THE MYTH OF RACE: THE TROUBLING PERSISTENCE OF AN UNSCIENTIFIC 
IDEA (2014); OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND 
(2014). 
 2. Matthew W. Hughey & Devon R. Goss, A Level Playing Field? Media Constructions of Athletics, Ge-
netics, and Race, 661 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 182, 182 (2015). 
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announced the completion of the Human Genome Project. In his remarks, President Bill 
Clinton stated:  
 
All of us are created equal, entitled to equal treatment under the law. 
After all, I believe one of the great truths to emerge from this triumphant 
expedition inside the human genome is that in genetic terms, all human 
beings, regardless of race, are more than 99.9 percent the same.3  
 
Many hoped this would mark the beginning of a post-racial world. Hughey and Goss 
point out that sports, in particular, seemingly offer a “color-blind space, affording a level 
playing field where only one’s training and skills are the hallmarks of competition.”4 
Sports stories, therefore, provide a promising site for signs of post-racialism. Instead, the 
study revealed that sports narratives explain achievement by black athletes as due to race-
specific biology.5 In contrast, the narratives attributed white athletic success to brains and 
hard work.6 Sports narratives’ use of so-called science masks the presence of racism, thus 
making it possible to claim color-blindness on the field of play. The Myth of Race provides 
the long history of the idea of biological race, while Blinded by Sight dissects the apparent 
visual obviousness of racial difference and claims of colorblindness. 
Both biological race and the visualness of race are mapped onto bodies of color. 
Sussman and Obasogie’s projects demonstrate how those ideas have configured the inte-
rior and exterior of those who are racialized. Both scholars probe the logic and obviousness 
of what we take as evidence of racial difference. What each reveals, in different ways, is 
how successful the claims of biological race and the visual obviousness of race have been. 
Both claims have positioned the racialized body as proof of racial difference and as buffer 
between the claims and their task in perpetuating racism. In addition, biological race and 
the visualness of race have proven to be remarkably persistent. They are, in a sense, evo-
lutionary successes. 
Sussman traces the idea of biological race from the fifteenth century forward in time, 
through a range of iterations. Obasogie’s qualitative study is contemporary. While his crit-
ical analysis is grounded in history and personal experience, his focus is on the present. 
He uses the interview data to reveal that dominant understandings of racial difference de-
pend on visual concepts, even for people who have been blind from birth. What his anal-
ysis shares with Sussman’s is the light it sheds on how racializing concepts are transferred. 
Sussman shows how biological race persisted over time. Obasogie shows how racism in-
culcates in real time. Ultimately, both books examine the ways in which racism has been, 
and continues to be, socially transmitted. 
II. THE MYTH OF RACE 
Sussman builds an intellectual history of the idea of biological race. His account 
                                                          
 3. Bill Clinton, Pres. of U.S., Remarks on Completion of First Human Genome Project (June 26, 2000), 
https://www.genome.gov/10001356. 
 4. Hughey & Goss, supra note 2, at 186. 
 5. Id. at 190. 
 6. Id. at 184, 187-88. 
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synthesizes existing scholarship and includes attributions throughout. This review focuses 
on Sussman’s synthesis. The book’s contributions lie in its totality. In my view, Sussman’s 
book has two parts. The first tracks the history of biological race from the Spanish Inqui-
sition to the fall of eugenics and the concomitant rise of cultural anthropology. In the sec-
ond, Sussman addresses what he calls “modern scientific racism.”7 He provides a biog-
raphy of the political forces behind the resurgence of biological race (the Pioneer Fund, in 
particular). In the last chapter, he shows how those forces have shaped the most recent 
anti-immigration policies. 
In the introduction, Sussman states that he is not a historian. Nevertheless, he pro-
vides a detailed historical account of two ideologies that have contributed to the develop-
ment of modern anthropology and sustained the idea of biological race. Proponents of 
monogenism asserted that humans had a common origin and that differences arose later in 
time. Proponents of polygenism argued that the different categories of humans had differ-
ent origins, and thus were different species. Sussman locates the origins of biological race 
in the Spanish Inquisition. “In order to squelch the large and rising number of Jews who 
had been forced to convert to Catholicism and who were gaining status financially and in 
the church, Old Christians were separated from New Christians, or conversos, on biologi-
cal grounds.”8 Scientific theories used to justify this new form of racism multiplied in 
content, spread geographically, and expanded in use to Native Americans, Asians, and 
Africans held in slavery. For the most part, the theories were versions of monogenism and 
polygenism. Throughout the book, Sussman highlights the role of different disciplines, 
including anthropology, in articulating the theories that sustained the idea of biological 
race. 
Sussman’s detailed account shows how monogenism and polygenism have shifted 
in relative influence over time. Monogenism aligns neatly with Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion and thus seems modern. Although, as Sussman points out, polygenism’s proponents 
co-opted Darwin’s work to substantiate Social Darwinism and its direct descendant, eu-
genics.9 One might wonder how polygenism, as defined above, persisted. From a twenty-
first century perspective, it sounds patently unsound. In fact, in the eighteenth century, 
monogenism proved more persuasive.10 Monogenism’s popularity, however, was not 
based on its scientific appeal, but on its creationist roots.11 Only later, did a wholly non-
theological version of monogenism emerge. 
During the same period, polygenism retained vigorous, albeit minority, support.12 
Polygenism became a racist ideology during this period. Influential and still-revered intel-
lectuals, such as Immanuel Kant, articulated a color-coded hierarchy of humanity that cor-
responded to Europe, Asia, Africa, and Native America.13 Kant’s theory nods to creationist 
                                                          
 7. See generally SUSSMAN, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
 9. Id. at 45. 
 10. Id. at 26. 
 11. Id. at 15, 26. 
 12. SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 26. 
 13. Id. at 27. 
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beginnings but attributes innate superiority and inferiority to continental climate differ-
ences.14 The ideals of rationality and full personhood that form the core of his philosophy 
are for whites only.15 Both the rationale and its reliance on color sound eerily familiar. 
Here, Obasogie’s point adds insight—racism’s genius, if you will, arises from its effec-
tiveness in making color the most obvious point of difference among people and freighting 
that visual cue with so much significance. 
The pre-modern historical account also documents how the ideologies adapted to 
political needs over time. In the eighteenth century, polygenism’s European iterations de-
veloped into distinctions among Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans.16 At the time, 
Sussman explains, the theory justified class distinctions by casting working classes as in-
ferior. The “Nordic” myth traces back to a theological claim of superiority that morphed 
into a claim of biological determinism. Then, in the nineteenth century, the “Nordic” myth 
became the claim of “Aryan” supremacy.17 Sussman follows polygenism forward in time 
to the early twentieth century. At that point, polygenism merged with eugenics and flour-
ished in both Europe and America.18 
Most legal and bioethics scholarship treats eugenics as if it spontaneously burst forth 
from Francis Galton in 1883.19 While historians acknowledge eugenics’ foundations in 
Social Darwinism, the sole attribution to Galton suggests that eugenics was an isolated 
product of its time. Situating eugenics within the larger history of scientific racism, as 
Sussman does, illuminates both what made it distinctive and how it enabled the long-term 
persistence of biological race. In its distinctive form, eugenics channeled the power of the 
state into biological management of its populations, in the name of the social good.20 In its 
adaptive form, eugenics carried forward belief in biological determinism. In the U.S., eu-
genics married Kantian scientific racism and rebirthed polygenism’s color-coded hierar-
chy. One of the products was anti-miscegenation law.21 Others, which Sussman explores 
in depth, included anti-immigration law and intelligence testing.22 
The Myth of Race provides a long view, enabling the reader to follow the threads of 
biological race from its various progenitors through decades, centuries, and multiple iter-
ations. This affords several insights. One can see, for example, how iterations of biological 
race originally viewed as inconsistent could be combined. Sussman’s assessment of eu-
genics in the U.S. highlights Madison Grant’s influence. Grant was “the eldest son of a 
very rich and distinguished family.”23 While Grant was Yale educated, he was not a sci-
entist. The long view makes it obvious that Grant’s version of biological race, published 
                                                          
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 28. 
 16. Id. at 37. 
    17.  SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 37. 
 18. Id. at 64. 
 19. See, e.g., NICHOLAS AGAR, LIBERAL EUGENICS: IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 3 (2004); 
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 3 (1985) (Chap-
ter 1 is titled, “Francis Galton, Founder of the Faith”); EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS 
IN THE DEEP SOUTH 18 (1995). 
 20. SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 51. 
 21. Id. at 72. 
 22. Id. at 89, 91-106. 
 23. Id. at 85. 
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in The Passing of the Great Race, was an incoherent mash-up of theories dating back to 
the eighteenth century.24 He combined “eighteenth-century, Humeian methodology of 
‘historical inductive reasoning,’” with Mendelian terms and “pre-Darwinian concepts of 
human diversity.”25 Yet, his popular book, in all its pseudo-scientific glory, provided fod-
der for eugenic measures in the U.S. and for Hitler.26 
The long view also enables a nuanced understanding of how purveyors of biological 
race adapted ideology to time and place. Grant’s views were tailored to leverage social 
stresses triggered by the influx of Southern and Eastern European immigrants and to co-
opt pre-existing racism against African Americans and Native Americans. His views pro-
vided a semblance of scientific legitimacy and intellectual structure to racist nativism and 
class-based elitism. In the 1930s, the Nazi’s embraced the U.S. version of biological race 
with its emphasis on negative or elimination eugenics.27 To mark the path of destruction 
that eugenic ideology took in Europe, Sussman uses selected examples of interactions be-
tween American and German proponents and of Nazi implementation. Here the approach 
is not to provide an exhaustive account—but a tour of the increasingly expansive iterations 
of eugenic thinking under a monstrous, authoritarian regime. 
In The Myth of Race, eugenics emerges as the most pernicious form of scientific 
racism in twentieth-century American and European history. The several chapters devoted 
to eugenics detail the academic and the social-political context in which eugenic ideology 
took hold and was challenged. Among academics in the U.S., Frank Boas emerged as eu-
genics’ primary intellectual opponent. Boas was a trained scientist and anthropologist. 
Sussman positions Boas’s work and its emphasis on complexity (rather than linearity) and 
culture (rather than genetics) as the “antidote” to eugenics. The work of Boas, his students, 
and other scholars such as Margaret Mead and Otto Klineberg challenged the primacy of 
physical anthropology over the emergent discipline of cultural anthropology. It also of-
fered a strong critique of the “science” behind eugenics that prompted even anthropology’s 
eugenics stalwarts to doubt its claims.28 Thus by 1930, while “eugenics was on the rise in 
physical anthropology in Europe, especially in Germany, it was undergoing a precipitous 
fall in America.”29 
At the same time, both American eugenicists and polygenism persisted in the world 
of politics. State legislatures continued to enact and implement involuntary sterilization 
and anti-miscegenation laws, and Congress maintained national origin quotas on immigra-
tion even during World War II when the plight of European Jews became undeniable.30 
However, as some of the political pressures that made eugenics appealing shifted in the 
1920s and 1930s, support for eugenics softened. Sussman describes the resulting social 
and cultural changes that made scientific racism less tenable. As a result, by the late 1940s, 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 88-90; MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF GREAT RACE (1916). 
 25. SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 88-89. 
 26. Id. at 91. 
 27. Id. at 110. 
 28. Id. at 186-88. 
 29. Id. at 190. 
 30. SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 104-05, 190. 
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the work of Boas and other cultural anthropologists stood ready as an alternative to eugen-
ics. Sussman characterizes the rejection of eugenics and scientific racism that followed 
key events such as the Great Depression and Nazism in Kuhnian terms. Boas’s work pro-
vided the opportunity for a paradigm shift.31 
The last four chapters comprise what I have designated the second part of the book. 
This part addresses modern scientific racism. Modern scientific racism, in Sussman’s 
terms, is the new polygenics; it has its roots in pre-World War II eugenics. This account 
begins in the 1920s and follows a particular group of eugenics die-hards into the post-
World War II era. Sussman focuses on two sets of activities. The first center on the Pioneer 
Fund, a private agency created in 1937 to implement eugenics policy. The second set cen-
ters on anti-immigrant efforts. 
The account of modern eugenics describes the individuals who created and shaped 
the Pioneer Fund, developing its goals and strategies over time. For those who believe that 
neo-Nazi, white separatist, and related white supremacist ideology flourishes only among 
economically oppressed whites with little formal education, the profile of the Pioneer Fund 
and its affiliates will prove disturbing. The list of supporters and grantees includes wealthy 
and influential individuals, as well as academics at well-regarded universities. During 
World War II, the agency was more or less dormant.32 After the war, the Fund took aim at 
racial desegregation and other civil rights efforts. The Pioneer Fund and like-minded or-
ganizations published their own journals, produced data that purported to show inherent 
racial differences in IQ, and used that data in efforts to overturn Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.33 The biological myth underpinning the data echoed the eighteenth-century ideo-
logical distinction between the Nordics or Aryans and inferior races.34 The updates used 
sociobiology’s premise that evolutionary success depends on “selfish genes,” thus present-
ing racism as “an evolutionary necessity.”35 
The Pioneer Fund and other eugenics proponents remain active into the twenty-first 
century. Some of the individuals that Sussman profiled have been at this for decades. But 
eugenics has garnered a new generation of supporters, as well. Their strategies remain 
largely the same—data production, dissemination, publicity of the new scientific racism, 
and support of laws and policies that express eugenic goals. Sussman takes a first-person 
stance in this part of the discussion. He raises his voice, metaphorically, in assessing the 
so-called science and the publicity tactics the new polygenecists have used.36 The shift in 
tone is a bit jarring and may be unnecessary, as the substance of his critique carries its own 
weight. 
The last chapter documents the contemporary resurgence of pre-World War II eu-
genics justifications for immigration restrictions. This time, the targets are Latinos and 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 197-98. 
 32. Id. at 217. 
 33. Id. at 230-31. 
 34. Id. at 246. 
 35. SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 247. 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 282. 
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Asians.37 In Sussman’s account, the new eugenics organizations are The American Re-
naissance Foundation, The American Immigration Control Foundation, and the Federation 
for American Immigration Reform. The Pioneer Fund, along with other contributors, has 
supported all of these organizations. The first two organizations have used scientific rac-
ism as an express justification for their positions. The Federation of American Immigration 
Reform has not used biological race as a justification, but the organization’s racist-nativist 
goals reflect eugenic beliefs that its leader, John Tanton, and no doubt many of its members 
hold.38 
While Sussman identifies the 1940s as the end of the eugenics era, he uses the last 
chapters to illustrate both its lunacy and its persistence. What disturbs is the extent to which 
the deep racial hatred behind the contemporary use of eugenics sustains the most crude, 
illogical semblance of science. As presented in these chapters, the myth of biological race 
has not evolved significantly. It persists but on the margins of larger movements fueled by 
racist-nativism.39 
What Sussman leaves unstated is that, in the meantime, a more sophisticated, more 
widely accepted form of biological race has formed. Others, including Troy Duster,40 
Osagie Obasogie,41 and Dorothy Roberts,42 have explicated “genetic race” and its perva-
sive use in biomedicine, law enforcement, and, as Hughey and Goss show, sports. Genetic 
race has become another vehicle for polygenism and biological determinism. It may be 
that genetic race makes the new-old eugenics seem plausible enough. That link between 
the margin and the mainstream is important. At the same time, Sussman’s primary target, 
white nativism and the role it plays in anti-immigrant law and policy, is both sizeable and 
pressing, now more than ever. 
III. BLINDED BY SIGHT 
Obasogie has written about biological race, but scientific racism plays a supporting 
role in Blinded by Sight. In Blinded by Sight, Obasogie focuses on what seems obvious, 
with emphasis on “seems.” He probes the assumption he calls “race” ipsa loquitur, that 
race is so obvious that it speaks for itself.43 He digs down to uncover how we come to see 
race and racial difference. Obasogie uses both empirical method and critical theory. In 
fact, the combination of the two approaches is part of the point he makes. Critical Race 
Theory (CRT) provides a valuable interpretive tool of the data collected by traditional 
sociological method, and the empirical data provides a basis for testing, substantiating, 
and extending the critical inquiry. 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 283. 
 38. Id. at 287-91. 
 39. See, e.g., ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW AND THE NATION-STATE (1999). 
 40. See, e.g., Troy Duster, Buried Alive: The Concept of Race in Science, in GENETIC NATURE/CULTURE: 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND SCIENCE BEYOND THE TWO-CULTURE DIVIDE 258-77 (Alan H. Goodman et al. eds., 
2003). 
 41. See, e.g., Osagie Obasogie, The Return of Biological Race? Regulating Race and Genetics Through Ad-
ministrative Agency Race Impact Assessments, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2012). 
 42. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-
CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011). 
 43. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 2. 
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Blinded by Sight has two parts. Both parts are packed. Part I sets out the theoretical 
framework and the findings based on interviews with blind and sighted people. Part II 
examines the concept of colorblindness and its effects in law and society in light of the 
empirical data. Obasogie then turns to the critique of Equal Protection jurisprudence and 
of the claims of post-racialism. His goal is to expand the social constructionist question 
from how is racial difference constructed?” to include “how do we come to see race and 
racial difference in the first place?” In Part II, he explores why and how that makes a 
difference in our social and legal understandings of justice. 
Obasogie’s touchstone for inquiry is that race is visually obvious. It is this point that 
he calls “race” ipsa loquitur.44 The irony is that making race visually obvious has been so 
successful that the question he asks is difficult to grasp. The question is how or what makes 
race obvious? Or, perhaps, how is it that when we look at others, we first see race and 
gender? The question reminded me of the experience I have when friends visiting from 
other countries ask, “How do you tell U.S. dollars apart?” I do not mean to trivialize Oba-
sogie’s important question with this example. It helps, however, to illustrate his question 
and the difficulty of seeing the question. If your country’s paper currency has different 
colors for different amounts, then the all-green U.S. dollars are difficult to sort. They all 
look alike. I answer my friends truthfully—I look at the numbers. The fact is that I have 
learned to look first at the corners of the bills and read the numbers, and my friends have 
learned to look first at the colors and infer the values they learned earlier. Obasogie’s 
question asks how is it that with respect to people, we have learned to look at colors and 
other visual cues and infer values we learned earlier? 
When I tell my friends, “I look at the numbers,” some of them think I am teasing. 
My answer seems circular. How do I know the value difference among the green bills? I 
look at the number. “Race” ipsa loquitur relies on circular logic. Racial difference seems 
obvious because race seems obvious. Obasogie points out that while social construction 
theory has been around for a while, scholars have focused almost exclusively on how we 
make the inferred assessment of value.45 Sussman’s work fits into this body of scholarship. 
He reveals the long-term view of the social-political forces that gave momentum to scien-
tific racism as a vehicle for constructing racial difference. Obasogie positions his work as 
a priori—“a constitutive theory of race that highlights the way in which social practices 
produce the ability to see and experience race in particular ways.”46 
Obasogie’s methodology joins two theoretical approaches. Empirical scholarship 
has been gaining influence in law. Yet critics have pointed out that it lends itself to de-
scription, and only small, discrete ideas. Critical race theory, on the other hand, has suf-
fered from the charge that the weighty claims it articulates lack evidence. Obasogie pro-
vides a detailed account of the two methods. He reviews their strengths and the criticisms 
of each. He then observes that what each lacks, the other provides. What he offers is a 
“constitutive theory of race.”47 Constitutive analysis uses a constructivist approach but 
                                                          
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 28-29. 
 46. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
 47. Id. at 48. 
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with empirical evidence. “[C]onstitutive analyses empirically situate the social practices 
and interactions that make certain outcomes possible.”48 Blinded by Sight is his effort to 
demonstrate that using both methods produces valuable insights about how race becomes 
“visually salient,” and what implications that process has for law and society.49 His work 
fits into an emerging body of work by scholars like Angela Onwuachi-Willig50 and Meera 
Deo.51 
In Part I, Obasogie uses qualitative data collected through interviews with sighted 
and blind people to address the question of how race becomes visually salient. The study 
is driven by the commonly held assumption that because blind people cannot literally see 
race, they are “color-blind” or hold a race-neutral view of society. The assumption indi-
cates the extent to which common understandings of race are premised on visual cues, and 
how reliance on visual descriptions of racial difference masks the social-political content 
used to construct racial difference. The interview data is fascinating. Among other things, 
it reveals, more baldly than I anticipated, the ways in which racialization filters the features 
we see and depend upon to signify racial difference. Respondents identified skin color and 
facial features most consistently as markers of racial identity, and tended to filter out sub-
tleties and complicating information.52 
Obasogie identifies the implications of these findings but never overworks the data. 
For example, many sighted respondents expressed the belief that “race reflects biological 
differences between human groups.”53 Obasogie suggests “that visual distinctions stand in 
for a whole host of secondary meanings.”54 He also draws on the larger scholarly discourse 
on race in his analysis of respondent statements. For example, he observes that respondents 
who identified as white often provided longer, more ambiguous answers than people of 
color did. Here, Obasogie refers to Barbara Flagg’s elucidation of the “transparency phe-
nomena,” a form of white consciousness (or unconsciousness) in which whiteness is so 
normative that whites understand race as something people of color have.55 In doing so, 
he forms a discursive link between the data and critical race theory. 
The constitutive analysis of the data nicely draws out a great deal of nuance, but two 
findings stand out. The first is that blind people described and understood race in visual 
terms. “When asked what is the first thing that comes to mind when hearing the word race, 
Carrie said, ‘I think of colors. Varying colors in people’s skin colors.’”56 This only seems 
surprising if you assume that blindness affects the ability to learn, not just the ability to 
use sight. In other words, the assumption that blind people must be color-blind rests not 
                                                          
 48. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 49. 
 49. Id. at 50. 
 50. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Still Hazy After All These Years: The Lack of Empirical Evidence 
and Logic Supporting Mismatch, 92 TEX. L. REV. 895 (2014). 
 51. See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, Empirically-Derived Compelling State Interests in Affirmative Action Jurispru-
dence, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (2014); Meera E. Deo, The Ugly Truth about Legal Academia, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 
943 (2015). 
 52. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 54. 
 53. Id. at 56. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 57 (citing Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Re-
quirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993)). 
 56. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original). 
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only on the claim that race is what we see, but also on the claim that those without sight 
cannot know racism. The assumption, it turns out, is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, 
it expresses the idea that race (and racism) is only skin-deep, and therefore, that blindness 
or color-blindness can eliminate racism. Obasogie’s analysis in Part II shows that color-
blind law and policy preserve white privilege. The other edge cuts against blind people. It 
turns blindness into an intellectual disability. Blind respondents, in fact, commented on 
the ways that ability norms positioned them as outsiders, even within their own racial 
groups. Some drew parallels between their own social marginalization and those of people 
of color. 
The second striking finding is that blind respondents were better able than sighted 
respondents to account for how they learned the salience of race. Because those blind since 
birth had not visually observed the many, often subtle, acts that family, friends, teachers, 
and strangers use to maintain racial boundaries, respondents learned the boundaries in 
other, more memorable ways. Many of the memories respondents shared to illustrate how 
they learned what race means were of lessons learned with pain. Sighted people also had 
family, friends, and others pointedly draw racial boundaries for them. But those socializa-
tions often confirmed rules they had seen in action. For blind people, the schooling felt 
starker. Once learned, however, the lesson was the same—that race and all the difference 
it signifies are self-evident. What Obasogie shows is that race is not what you see. Rather, 
the ability to see or know race in visual terms is socially transmitted. Because “[s]kin color 
and other visual cues become shorthand for difference,”57 thus making race seem obvious, 
the visual cues hide the social transmitting work that preceded them. 
The qualitative data substantiates much social constructionist work. It counters 
charges that Critical Race Theory primarily consists of a set of political claims. The con-
stitutive analysis also expands the critical inquiry. In the first part of Blinded by Sight, the 
analysis helps clarify the relationship between the visualness of race and the persistence 
of biological race in the twenty-first century. Sussman highlights the role of political or-
ganization and funding in perpetuating scientific racism. Obasogie’s constitutive approach 
shows how neatly the idea that race is self-evident dovetails with the widely pervasive, 
unscientific idea of biological race. The resulting embodiment of difference merges into 
the visual obviousness of race. 
In Part II of Blinded by Sight, Obasogie delves into the implications of the findings. 
He first examines the concept of colorblindness, and then critiques its role in both Equal 
Protection jurisprudence and public discourse about post-racialism. Much of his assess-
ment of colorblindness is familiar. He challenges the premise of colorblindness—that in-
tentional disregard of race will lead to equality.58 He draws on critical theory’s attacks on 
formal equality for some key points. The idea of colorblindness minimizes the role of race 
as a social-political force.59 It treats race as only a physical trait and denies the social 
meaning that makes race so very obvious. Obasogie points out that colorblindness is also 
ahistorical; it treats race as if the social-political structures built on race do not have the 
                                                          
 57. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 63. 
 58. Id. at 117. 
 59. Id. at 116. 
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weight of history behind them.60 
The examination of colorblindness identifies Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson as the source of the concept. Harlan’s assertion of white supremacy 
as fact in the sentences immediately preceding his statement that the “Constitution is color-
blind,” foreshadows Obasogie’s core argument.61 Obasogie’s analysis of the ways in 
which the idea of colorblindness has been used leads to his conclusion that colorblindness 
produces white privilege.62 He concludes: “[T]he metaphor should simply be retired from 
social, legal, and political thought.”63 
The critique of the role of colorblindness in Equal Protection jurisprudence opens 
with the observation that metaphors can distort and oversimplify.64 Obasogie comments 
on two recent Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action, Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education. He reveals the operation of colorblindness in these cases. More specifically, he 
shows how equality defined as colorblindness disassociates race from the social signifi-
cance of race and from its group dynamics.65 He uses this analysis to make the case for 
empirically undercutting the use and power of the blindness metaphor.66 Here, the focus is 
on the constitutive theory of race and the work it does. Obasogie then shifts the focus to 
close examination of the role of “race” ipsa loquitur in Equal Protection jurisprudence. 
He focuses on the role of visibility and how it screens from the Court’s view the ways in 
which race structures and weights social life and political authority. Here, the book’s title 
becomes substance. Because sighted people are blinded by sight, “their vision prevents 
them from appreciating the role of social practices in producing the salience of race.”67 
While other scholars have made similar points, Obasogie’s work in Part I significantly 
elaborates upon and substantiates this point. Thus, Obasogie calls into question the Court’s 
(and dominant society’s) normative account of equality. 
Obasogie writes gracefully, with both precision and eloquence. He transitions be-
tween interview data and analysis smoothly, with none of the choppiness that characterizes 
much of empirical scholarship. In addition, he incorporates popular culture, personal nar-
rative, and actual events throughout Blinded by Sight. He references the sermons of 
Fredrick K.C. Price, Life magazine’s World War II-era photographic tutorial on “typical” 
Chinese and Japanese facial features, a controversy over Hewlett Packard’s facial recog-
nition software, the two versions of “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner,” and other sources 
as texts and as additional evidence of the pervasiveness of the visualness of race and its 
blinding force. He opens discussion of post-racialism with reference to the now freighted-
with-death “hoodie” worn by Trayvon Martin and other youth.68 George Zimmerman’s 
shooting of African American, seventeen-year-old Martin and the many other recent acts 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 117. 
 61. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
 62. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 115. 
 63. Id. at 128. 
 64. Id. at 130. 
 65. Id. at 136. 
 66. Id. at 137. 
 67. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 158. 
 68. Id. at 163. 
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of violence against men and women of color have proven the fallacy of post-racialism. 
Post-racialism, Obasogie shows, is a companion of colorblindness. There may be a 
hopeful, Pollyanna-ish version and a more strategic version. Both versions, however, re-
quire willful disregard of social reality. Obasogie probes President Obama’s early silence 
on race and his shift in response to Trayvon Martin’s death to illustrate both the fallacy of 
post-racialism and the way it produces white privilege. This recalls a preceding discussion 
on the way in which many whites perceive racism as a zero sum game. In response to a 
survey about the persistence of racism in the present day, whites were not only more likely 
to say that racism against blacks had ended but also that racism against whites was a sig-
nificant problem.69 In this view, equality results in deprivation—deprivation of white priv-
ilege. This describes relationships between racial groups as inherently problematic and 
equality as inherently threatening. In the last chapter, Obasogie explains the synergy be-
tween colorblindness and post-racialism, and concludes that “colorblind post-racialism re-
deems whiteness and places it back in the cherished social position that it occupied before 
the civil rights movement.”70 He ends, however, by pointing to the lessons learned from 
blind people who are able to see beyond the claim that race is self-evident.71 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Myth of Race and Blinded by Sight provide a rich pairing. Sussman provides a 
centuries’ long account of the persistence of scientific racism by ideological adaptation. 
Obasogie provides a present time account that challenges the self-evident nature of race 
and explicates the implications of the visual obviousness of race. Reading either is enrich-
ing and satisfying. Pairing them puts the two approaches in conversation with each other. 
They have similar aims—busting the myths that sustain racism. Because of that, neither 
Obasogie nor Sussman highlights the forces that have disrupted the transmission of race. 
Obasogie does point to blind people’s lack of sight as a key factor in seeing beyond the 
claim that race is self-evident. But both his and Sussman’s material seems rich enough to 
hold additional nuggets. That disappointment is minor, given the books’ goals and accom-
plishments. 
Both analyses situate human physiology as central to the forms of racial ideology at 
issue in their respective projects. Sussman’s account, going back to the Spanish Inquisi-
tion, mirrors changes in understandings of the human body. Scientific racism and medical 
accounts of the body started with gross anatomy (e.g., skull differences) and eventually 
shifted to the molecular level (e.g., genetic race). Obasogie’s analysis focuses on the role 
of sight. In her critique of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, Reva Siegel states, 
“[m]ore than any doctrinal factor, it is the physiological framework in which the Court 
reasons about reproductive regulation that obscures the gender-based judgments that may 
animate such regulations and the gender-based injuries they can inflict on women.”72 Sit-
uating race in a physiological framework has had a similar effect. It calls attention to the 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 115. 
 70. Id. at 176. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1992). 
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relevant biological paradigm—the skull, the brain, muscles, and the genes—rather than 
onto the social content of that paradigm and its political use. 
Sussman and Obasogie both cite the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization’s (UNESCO) 1950 statement that “race” is not a biological reality.73 As 
noted, genome scientists and world leaders made a similar pronouncement in 2000. In fact, 
resurgences in both marginal and mainstream uses of biological race have followed each 
announcement. Sussman and Obasogie document the depth to which racism is inscribed 
in our social and national mythology. They illuminate the social practices and political 
forces that sustain racism. What becomes clear is that neither science nor law has coun-
tered the force of white privilege embedded in nativism, colorblindness, and post-racial-
ism. 
 
                                                          
 73. OBASOGIE, supra note 1, at 24, 26-27; SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 1, 207-08. 
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